



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6- VISITS - - - 1/EA

12 MAY 1981

In reply refer
to: I-21704/81

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JAPANESE
PRIME MINISTER ZENKO SUZUKI, May 8, 1981, 2:30-3:30 PM,
BLAIR HOUSE

(S) Prime Minister Suzuki welcomed the Secretary, Mr. Allen, and the leadership of the Pentagon also in attendance. Secretary Weinberger thanked the Prime Minister and offered to let him speak first as requested the previous evening by Ambassador Okawara. The Prime Minister stated that since he had explained Japan's view on defense at some length to the President earlier in the day, that request was no longer valid and thus invited the Secretary to proceed.

(S) The Secretary stated that he felt the President had clearly stated the situation, i.e., the U.S. and Japan were equal partners facing the Soviet threat. It was necessary for the two countries to share the burden in the most effective ways by sharing tasks and missions in many quarters of the globe. The President mentioned the threat in the Pacific, as exemplified by the presence of Soviet forces in Japan's Northern Territories. The President also said that the U.S. has complete confidence in the Japanese Government's abilities to persuade public opinion in accordance with the Constitution and confidence in the strength of Japan's great economy.

(S) The Secretary stated that the U.S. looked forward to the opportunity to discuss security issues in detail at the SSC in June and during the Defense Minister's visit to Washington later the same month. But this afternoon he wished to give the Prime Minister a broad outline of the specifics the U.S. wanted to raise at those two important meeting so that there would be no surprises.

(S) The Secretary stated that underlying all specifics was the basic principle that the U.S. did not want Japan to do more so that the U.S. could do less but that both countries had to do more because of the increasing threat. He said that one of the first things President Reagan did upon taking office due to his concern about the deterioration in U.S. defense capability was to recommend a supplemental defense budget for the present fiscal year and a very significant increase for next year.

OSD review completed

SECRET

Classified by ASD/ISA
Declassify on 11 Nov 1987

SECRET

The Secretary said he felt that the Congress was about to act favorably on those requests. The supplementary request was directed to the most glaring deficiencies such as ammunition, torpedoes, and tactical aircraft; the increase for next year concentrated on longer range items such as the strategic arsenal, the nuclear umbrella which the U.S. also felt had become vulnerable. In Hawaii the U.S. wanted to discuss ways to increase Japan's air and maritime capabilities in the area around Japan in order to help the U.S. in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area where it is necessary for the U.S. to deploy forces. The Secretary said the U.S. was enormously concerned that all strengthening should be done as quickly as possible, within the next five years. Japan and the U.S. should share the burdens so that the total addition would be largely made within this period of time. He stated that the U.S. wished to create a partnership with Japan north of the Philippines and west of Guam within this five year period in order to balance the threat which needs to be countered during that period of time. By strengthening together in that area in order to counter the threat there the U.S. could release some forces for use in the Indian Ocean or other areas.

(S) The Secretary concluded that the only goal of the U.S. was to maintain peace with strength and that Japan was enormously important in that effort. If peace were not maintained with strength, if the Soviets were not balanced, we could face defeat, either in surrender or in subjugation. He expressed appreciation for this opportunity to present these views to the Prime Minister prior to the talks in Hawaii and with the Defense Minister in Washington. He hoped that these specifics provided earlier-on would allow more opportunity for conclusive meetings.

(S) The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for his concise summary of what he'd like to see within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. He said he'd like to give the Secretary's message a great deal of thought as he hears the views of the Defense Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance. He would listen to all these and then formulate his own judgment. The points he heard today would help him in formulating that judgment.

(S) The Prime Minister stated that as he had told President Reagan earlier in the day his basic thoughts on defense were as follows:

1.) that Japan should defend itself with the strength of its own hands as quickly as possible; and

2.) that as the other pillar of that policy Japan should give a great deal of attention to make its defense cooperation with the U.S. smoother and more effective.

With a view to achieving these two goals as soon as possible, Japan would have to make efforts on many fronts: political, economic, and with respect to public opinion. He hoped the Secretary would understand that Japan's Government needed to

SECRET

SECRET

3.

use care so as not to invite strong resistance within the country which would frustrate positive efforts. He needed to emphasize management of these many fronts but pledged to provide clear guidelines to Minister Omura when he visits in June so that he can fruitfully discuss the details mentioned by the Secretary. The Prime Minister then invited Foreign Minister Ito to comment.

(S) Ito also stated that Defense Minister Omura could discuss the subjects mentioned by the Secretary, but the Foreign Minister wanted to discuss one point now. He asked the Secretary to recall their meeting in March when the Secretary had mentioned the area north of the Philippines and west of Guam. Ito had pointed out that talking of extending Japan's defense to that area could cause difficulties in the Diet and that his suspicion had proven correct. The Government had replied to critics as follows: If this concept meant some type of exercise whereby Japan and the U.S. cut up areas to defend, this could give rise to some kind of collective self-defense responsibilities for Japan which would not be permitted under the Constitution. With regard to range, under the present Defense Program Outline, Japan was working for a radius of defending the seas around Japan of several hundred miles and sea lanes out to 1000 miles. If what the Secretary was suggesting goes much further, it could lead to critical difficulties. These were the issues raised in the Diet and the Foreign Minister wished to apprise the Secretary of them.

The Secretary responded that he was not presumptive enough to try to interpret Japan's Constitution, but he said as far as he knew nothing he had suggested was in violation of the Constitution. He said that he felt that greater cooperation worked out in detail but that he felt that responsibilities, could be that area, by exchanging or sharing of responsibilities, could be the U.S. to concentrate more in areas like the Indian Ocean. He said that a 1000-mile arc might be appropriate for Japan, that or less than that might be acceptable, but that the most important thing was working together. He stated that he was pleased that the Prime Minister say that he felt Japan should move as far as possible. The Secretary said this was particularly important since we could not be sure how much time might be available. He also noted that the Prime Minister stated that they should do as much as possible. The Secretary felt this was necessary for both countries and for his part stated that they would like to take any actions or refrain from taking any which would help bring about this result.

The Secretary once again thanked the Prime Minister for the sentiment which the Prime Minister echoed as well.

Richard L. Armitage

R. L. Armitage
Deputy Assistant Secretary
East Asia

SECRET